MOMENTUM QUARTERLY
ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR SOZIALEN FORTSCHRITT

2023 | Vol. 12, No. 3, p. 167–190

Die ideologischen Grundlagen von universeller und exkludierender Solidarität in Österreich

*Andreas Schadauer, Jörg Flecker**

Zusammenfassung

Solidarität ist ein, besonders in Zeiten der Krise, gerne aufgegriffenes und eingefordertes Konzept. Auch in den Sozialwissenschaften genießt es eine lange Tradition, blieb aber nichtsdestotrotz ein eher unklarer Begriff, um den sich noch viele offene Fragen ranken. Dieser Artikel, aufbauend auf theoretische Literatur, plädiert für ein multidimensionales Verständnis von Solidarität, das Einstellungen bezüglich globalen, institutionellen, gruppenorientierten und unterstützenden Dimensionen von Solidarität gemeinsam berücksichtigt und empirisch erfasst. Dies erlaubt es zwischen zwei zunehmend öffentlich und politisch diskutierten und umkämpften Typen von Solidarität zu unterscheiden: universelle und exkludierende Solidarität. Der Artikel geht weiters der Frage nach, was Präferenzen für diese Typen von Solidarität in der österreichischen (Umfrage-)Bevölkerung befördert, mit einem Schwerpunkt auf den Einfluss von Ideologien. Dieser Ansatz wird empirisch anhand von Umfragedaten und multiplen linearen Regressionen getestet, was erlaubt, eine bestehende Lücke zwischen empirischer und theoretischer Literatur zu schließen. Darüber hinaus ermöglicht dieser Ansatz, den Zusammenhang zwischen Solidarität und der Wahrnehmung von Gruppenkonstruktionen und Zugehörigkeiten zu thematisieren. Letzteres ist notwendig, um diese beiden Typen von Solidarität und deren ideologische Fundamente miteinander vergleichen und unterscheiden zu können.

Schlagwörter: *Solidarität, Ideologie, sozialer Zusammenhalt, politische Soziologie*

The Ideological Foundations of Universal and Exclusive Solidarity in Austria

Abstract

Solidarity is a term and concept many appeal to, especially during crises. It also enjoys a long tradition within social sciences but nevertheless remains a rather ambiguous term with many open questions attached. Based on theoretical literature, this article introduces a multidimensional empirical concept of solidarity by combining opinions regarding global, institutional, group-oriented, and supportive dimensions of solidarity, or a lack thereof. This allows for differentiation between two publicly and politically discussed and contested types of solidarity: universal and exclusive solidarity. The article then further addresses what influences the Austrian (survey) population's preferences regarding these types of solidarities, with a focus on ideologies. This is empirically tested via survey data and multiple linear regression models. This approach allows for closing an existing gap between the theoretical and empirical literature and for more thoroughly examining the relation between solidarity and the perception of groupings and belongings. The latter is necessary to contrast the different types of solidarity.

Keywords: *solidarity, ideologies, social cohesion, political sociology*

** Corresponding author*
Andreas Schadauer
University of Vienna, Department of Sociology
Rooseveltplatz 2, 1090 Vienna
Phone: +43 1 4277-49233
andreas.schadauer@univie.ac.at
ORCID: 0000-0001-7032-2687

Coauthor
Jörg Flecker
University of Vienna, Department of Sociology
Rooseveltplatz 2, 090 Vienna
Phone: +43 1 4277-48142
joerg.flecker@univie.ac.at
ORCID: 0000-0001-6363-4527

We would like to thank Saskja Schindler for her helpful comments and support and Carina Altreiter and Istvàn Grajczjar for their work in the Solidarity in Crisis Project the article is based on. We would also like to thank the two reviewers whose helpful feedback helped improve the article and we would also like to thank Leonhard Dobusch of the editorial team for his support and patience.

Survey Data Availability: https://search.gesis.org/research_data/SDN-10.7802-2291

Introduction

On many occasions—not least during the Covid-19 pandemic—citizens have been called upon to show solidarity. In recent years, researchers have increasingly investigated solidary attitudes and actions. Yet, in spite of the concept of solidarity's long tradition in social sciences, it has remained a rather ambiguous term that has left many questions unanswered.

While some conceptualize solidarity as either given or not, i.e., contrasting solidary with non-solidary orientations, others suggest arranging expressions of solidarity on a continuum (Stjerno 2005). Differences also relate to how many and what dimensions best capture solidarity. In addition, the distinction between universal solidarity addressing all people and solidarity with a select few based on socioeconomic status, nationality, racialization, etc., has become an increasingly prominent topic in policy of late. Empirical research is also inconclusive regarding the causes of solidarity. What leads people to show solidarity with others in their attitudes or actions? Often, and particularly in quantitative research, the answers reside in the sociodemographic and socioeconomic characteristics of different groups of people. Since this has not been particularly fruitful, we suggest in this contribution to additionally focus on ideologies. This allows for analyzing the influence of authoritarian, racializing, nationalist, and success ideologies. This means seeing solidarity as embedded in different views and assessments of the world, thereby advancing or inhibiting certain types of solidarities—here universal solidarity vs. solidarity excluding certain members of society.

Starting from a multidimensional concept of solidarity and understanding it as a continuum, this paper addresses the influence of ideologies on solidary attitudes and actions. It introduces a concept of solidarity that unites different aspects of solidarity that were previously addressed separately. Solidarity is construed here as a combination of opinions expressing (a lack of) global, institutional, group-oriented, and supportive solidarity. This allows for differentiation between two types of solidarity: universal and exclusive solidarity. Two types that regularly cause tensions within societies in general but also within social and political movements. The influence of ideologies is analyzed via survey-based data and by means of several multiple linear regression models with socioeconomic characteristics as control variables.

For the empirical analysis, Austria is taken as an example, allowing an interesting case study on the topic of solidarity and ideology: As the first country within the European Union to have a far-right party in government (the FPÖ, 2000–2005), it showcased early on that racist and authoritarian ideologies are not only at the margins but mainstream and widespread. Since 2017, the conservative ÖVP party has openly shifted to a right-wing anti-immigrant stance while maintaining its anti-welfare position. In general, the Austrian welfare state is described as a conservative, male-breadwinner welfare regime under constant pressure to economize (Österle/Heitzmann 2019), allowing insights into complex views on institutionalized solidarity. Hence, while Austria shares several traits with many other countries at least within the EU, it has often been at the forefront when it comes to (modern) debates of welfare restrictions and the advancement of right-wing politics.

In the following chapter, the notion of solidarity as a continuum is discussed from different points of view. For this we refer to select literature relevant to this article, as a comprehensive literature review would go far beyond the scope of this text. Then, Hall's (1986, 2016) conceptualization of ideologies is introduced before arguing for the influence of ideologies on solidarity. An overview of the current state of research leads to the formulation of the research question and the relevant data for the empirical analysis. The operationalization of the two solidarity concepts is then outlined before the survey outcome is presented. The paper closes with a discussion of the merits of a multifaceted conceptualization of solidarity and a conclusion stressing the importance of considering ideologies to explain different types of solidarity.

Solidarity as a Continuum or the Many Faces of Solidarity

In most social theories and literature considered for this article, solidarity is seen as a relevant social force. Usually, solidarity denotes one of many ways in which humans are connected to form a group or community (Smith/Sorrell 2014: 228). In its broadest sense as described by Scholz (2015: 725), "solidarity is a collective relation that mediates between the individual and the community" and entails "duties or commitments to actions." In this sense and from a structuralist point of view, Durkheim (2016 orig. 1893: 112ff.) argued early on that solidarity is a basic condition enabling communities, societies, and social cohesion. This notion

was also dominant within the early history of the labor movement, which saw solidarity as a social resource to counter the power of industry and capital, but also went beyond this by aiming to change society for the better for all (Große Kracht 2017: 63 ff.). Often within this literature, the argument follows that it relies on an emotionally underpinned mutual connection subjectively seen as meaningful (Prisching 2011: 158) and therefore generates expectations of support tied to legitimate aims of the solidary community. As a consequence, people are not only ready to support each other even at their own expense but also to legitimize exclusion by limiting solidarity to members of a certain group.

As far as more precise definitions of solidarity are concerned, what is considered solidarity varies from study to study and approach to approach. This ranges, as mentioned, from a general means of social ordering in contemporary societies, to claiming certain actions of members of society show solidarity or not based on their intentions, to seeing it as a general concept indicating that social coexistence and social actions can (or should) not be reduced to power and occasionally shared individual interests alone (e.g., Beckert et al. 2004). A wide variety of understandings can be found even at the level of the individual dimensions of the concept (Lessenich et al. 2020): between social and political solidarity; between institutionalized norms and individual behavior; between particularism and universalism; or between unilateralism and reciprocity. Scholz (2015) for example differentiates between three meanings of solidarity based on existing religious, civic, political, and social scientific practices. "Social solidarity of humanity" corresponds with Durkheim's (2016) and similar authors' concept of solidarity as a necessary element of societies with a distinct division of labor. "Civic solidarity" on the other hand focuses on the relation between the individual and the community via institutions, e.g., welfare state, political organizations. Lastly, "political solidarity is grounded in a commitment to a common cause to end injustice or oppression" (Scholz 2015: 732). The latter finds its expression in social and political movements and beyond. While these concepts differentiate between the reach of solidarity and at what level it takes place, Stjernø (2005) offers another perspective. He argues that solidarity is differentially enacted according to four aspects: the foundations (e.g., shared interests, altruism), the objective or function (e.g., strengthening of a certain community, reaching a common goal), who is included and excluded, and how strongly it is oriented toward collectivity or individualism. These aspects can be identified within all three meanings outlined by Scholz and can take the shape of inclusive or universal, as well as exclusive, solidarity. It can take a permanent form, or appear for just a limited time or inform a singular action. As none of these aspects dominates, solidarity can be seen as a multidimensional approach to solidarity.

This approach is also supported by the empirical literature, which stresses an open-ended notion of solidarity and which most of the time focuses on the motivation or intentions of the possible agents of solidarity. In the quantitative studies considered for this article, solidarity is operationalized in specific social contexts, activities, or norms with a focus on various select aspects of solidarity. In the anthology *Solidarity in Europe*, edited by Lahusen and Grasso (2018), it is addressed as social activism, including attending marches, donating money, food, and/or time, boycotting, and active and passive membership in organizations that support different vulnerable groups (refugees, the unemployed, disabled people). Denz (2003) also counts general attitudes, e.g., toward the importance of sharing, redistribution, etc., and the readiness to support and include (or exclude) different members of society as aspects of solidarity. The European Values Study survey relies on a very basic notion of solidarity focusing on concern for the living conditions of people separated either spatially or by certain attributes, e.g., immigrants, unemployed, sick. This is used to identify three correlated types of solidarity—local, global, and social solidarity—which according to Lomazzi (2021) differ in their composition across countries, making reliable comparisons challenging. The broad literature on the acceptance of the welfare state can also be classified as addressing a specific form of institutionalized or civic solidarity (Grausgruber 2019; Kootstra 2016; Svallfors 1997). Welfare support is also addressed by Gerhards et. al. (2019) as one form of transnational solidarity at the European level. Furthermore, Arndt (2018) conceptualizes solidarity via questions of income redistribution vs. marked allocation. However, none combines the varying aspects or dimensions of solidarity; instead, they are mainly treated separately (e.g., are there people, and if so how many, who show solidarity on the local, as well as the global and social, level or on the local and social but not on the global level?). Also, none comprehensively addresses what it is that informs the different so constructed types of solidarity.

The Significance of Ideologies for Understanding Solidarity

What are the foundations of solidarity? As Smith and Sorrell (2014) summarize, the foundation of solidarity is at least twofold. Certain sociodemographic and socioeconomic characteristics of actors may generate situations in which individuals align with group advantages and goals, which the authors somewhat misleadingly label as *objective* foundation. These shared interests due to similar social positions (can) stimulate coordinated actions. What causes solidary attitudes and actions is therefore often derived from these characteristics. This includes, among others, access to social resources like income or education tied to social status, but also dominant gender roles (see e.g., Lahusen/Grasso 2018) and social class within capitalist societies (see e.g., Prisching 2011).

However, most of the time, these *objective* foundations alone do not necessarily motivate and sustain solidarity but rely on worldviews, ideologies, perceptions of the world, labeled by Smith and Sorrell also misleadingly as *subjective*. These dimensions broach the issue of how these sociodemographic and socioeconomic similarities are recognized in the first place. As a shared common interest alone does not guarantee consolidated action and support, it relies on a definition of the situation and its perception. Here ideologies come into play as this definition is not left to the subjects alone. *Subjective definitions* are strongly connected to concepts of *ideas or worldviews* as introduced by Weber and ideologies as elaborated by Hall (1986, 2016). It is Hall's conceptualization of ideologies that will be used to conceptualize these *subjective foundations* of solidarity.

Hall discusses ideologies in the sense of "mental frameworks—the languages, the concepts, categories, imagery of thoughts, and the systems of representation—which different classes and social groups deploy in order to make sense of, define, figure out and render intelligible the way society works" (Hall 1986: 29). Social actors rely on ideological frameworks to act out their different and sometimes even contradictory social roles, e.g., workers, consumers, citizens, voters, etc. By doing so, ideologies "naturalize" social relations and offer "positions of identification and knowledge" to claim "authentic truths" about society, the world, and everything (2016: 151 f.). Racism and sexism are dominant ideologies that work in this way: they mask the power structure at work and arrange the allocation of material and cultural resources accordingly (Hall 2016: 174 f.).

Solidarity can be seen as being embedded in a multitude of competing ideologies or, to adapt a phrase by Hall, solidarity intentions are formulated "within ideologies" (Hall 2021: 100). Ideologies permeate the shape and form of solidarity, including what it entails or lacks, which justifies assigning certain specifications such as "inclusive," "universal," "exclusive," "fascist," etc. (Flecker et al. 2018; Stjernø 2005). This view is shared by Börner (2018) when speaking of the "elasticity of solidarity" constructed by patterns of inclusion and exclusion inscribed in practices and institutions and in a similar vein by Nowicka et al. (2019: 393) by connecting transnational solidarity to discourses oscillating "between cosmopolitan inclusiveness and religious and ethnic exclusiveness."

Challenges for Quantitative Empirical Research on Solidarity

A significant number of studies focus on attitudes toward the welfare state as one form of institutionalized solidarity. Van Oorschot (2000) stresses the relevance of notions of "deservingness" in a survey study on the willingness to grant public support. There, deservingness is strongly tied to ascribed origin, willingness to work, contributions made to society, and being in real need. Several studies also identified a connection between "racial attitudes" and the rejection of welfare measures (see Hjorth 2016 for Europe; and Harell et al. 2016; Gilens 1995 for the US), which is also tightly connected to the deservingness topic. Kluegel and Myano (1995) tested the influence of another kind of ideology on support for the welfare state, namely "justice beliefs." Besides egalitarianism and a belief in the general fairness of the market, they also included "success ideology," i.e., the view that equal opportunity is already realized. All three justice beliefs are discussed as influential. Several authors draw similar conclusions, stating that opinions of the welfare state can mainly be explained by ideologies (see e.g., Grausgruber 2019; Corneo/Grüner 2002).

Beyond institutionalized solidarity in the form of the welfare state, the connection between solidarity and ideology has been less thoroughly examined in the literature reviewed for this article. Based on survey data from Austria, Denz (2003) shows a negative connection between authoritarianism and solidarity with foreigners but a slightly more positive one with support for

neighbors and the elderly. A similar relation was observed by Maggini (2018: 154) for Italy, with authoritarian views negatively correlated with support for refugees and religiosity positively connected to support for refugees, the unemployed, and disabled people. In the same study, solidarity is also shown as being connected to certain conditions (e.g., access to social support only for migrants who pay taxes) and notions of deservingness. Nowicka et al. (2019) point toward "cosmopolitan" vs. "particularistic" boundary-setting in media discourses and everyday conversations underpinning transnational solidarity manifested in support for refugees.

There are, however, three major shortcomings in these studies. First, most of them focus on one type of ideology alone or rather one aspect of solidarity (e.g., global vs. local, social solidarity, social engagement). Although some point out that the different types are significantly correlated (e.g., Lomazzi 2021), none combines the different aspects of solidarity (e.g., institutional solidarity and global solidarity or rejection of one but support for the other) into one solidarity item. Hence none considers solidarity as combining different aspects, e.g., solidarity that supports redistribution on a global level and more support for the unemployed while at the same time refusing privileges due to place of origin, or vice versa: solidarity with the unemployed but favoring privileges due to place of origin, and rejecting global redistribution. For this reason, there is a considerable gap between the theoretical and empirical literature. First, the theoretical literature—e.g., by Scholz (2015) or Stjernø (2011)—addresses solidarity as a complex social phenomenon dealing with different social dimensions and topics at the same time. In most cases the empirical literature on the other hand reduces solidarity to a single topic or dimension.

Second, ideologies within the reviewed literature are often relegated to an ancillary role below social status when explaining solidary opinions. Due to this, the ideology variables are given rather little and unsystematic attention, if at all (e.g., Lahusen/Grasso 2018). This is quite surprising, as sociodemographic and socioeconomic variables themselves often hold little to no explanatory power within these studies compared to ideology (e.g., Grausgruber 2019; Maggini 2018; Denz 2003). For example, political opinions show significantly more influence than the sociodemographic and economic variables within Grausgruber's (2019: 470) analyses of attitudes toward support for the unemployed within the Austrian Social Survey. However, the text discussing the outcome of the survey spends little time on the role of attitudes and ideologies compared to respondents' socioeconomic standing.

The third shortcoming is that the relationship between ideologies and solidarity is not explicitly elaborated and reflected upon. Typically, ideology is seen as influencing solidary attitudes, but it is not explicitly discussed or argued for; however, two implicit arguments can be found in the literature.

First, in the studies dealing with solidarity and ideology, solidarity is in most cases conceptualized and operationalized in more concrete terms pointing toward action or more precise opinions of social or political topics, e.g., donations (of time and money) or public support for the unemployed or refugees. Ideology, on the other hand, is formulated in more general terms, e.g., on the left-right scale, or items like "this country needs strong leaders" on the authoritarianism scale. Ideology forms a more general state of the mental frameworks in which more concrete solidary opinions and actions are embedded. An exception are studies where attitudes, concerns, or ideologies are seen as part of solidarity, or rather where the solidarity items are constructed using attitudes, concerns, or ideologies, but these, as far as we can tell, do not address the issue of similarities or differences between them (see e.g., Grajczjár et al. 2022; Lomazzi 2021).

Second, the concept of deservingness underlying solidarity as addressed in several studies is tightly connected to the notion of ideology as discussed above. The categories (e.g., majority vs. minority, hard-working vs. lazy) used to distinguish between those deserving and undeserving of solidarity and support are not inscribed in the notions of solidarity itself. Ideologies introduce and offer the categories on which questions like who should get what and why can be based.

In summary, the discussed theoretical literature proposes an understanding of solidarity as necessarily multidimensional and multifaceted and rooted in complex social arrangements. It shows that solidarity has many shapes and forms irreducible to specific actions or attitudes. The empirical literature, however, mainly focuses on separate dimensions of solidarity, on single actions or demands for actions classified as either solidary or not. The multidimensional character of solidarity is largely left unexplored. This is also the case for the *subjective* or ideological foundation of solidarity. If considered at all, only selected ideologies have been considered in the empirical literature. Some, especially empirical, literature also treats attitudes, concerns, or

ideologies as part of solidarity. Other on the other hand, it operationalizes solidarity more as concrete action or demand for actions or support distinct from attitudes, ideologies, or concerns, which are more abstract and not necessarily entirely linked to concrete demands or actions. How different ideologies taken together may steer solidary attitudes and actions has not yet been analyzed.

Research Question and Data

Based on the discussion of the literature, the following main research questions guide this empirical study: How can multidimensional notions of solidarity be constructed within a survey study, how are they distributed among the (survey) population, and what are their ideological foundations? Due to the exploratory nature of this approach and after previous unsuccessful attempts to construct three or more solidarity types for this article, this was later further narrowed to two types of solidarity—universal and exclusive—and the first question reformulated as: how can universal and exclusive solidarity be multidimensionally constructed within a survey study? Though thematically limiting, contrasting what drives universal compared to exclusive solidarity nevertheless addresses currently pressing issues within Austrian society in general but also within certain political and social movements including the labor movement, which more often than not oscillates between these two types of solidarity (Große Kracht 2017).

The empirical analysis is based on a telephone survey conducted in Austria between July and September 2017 and in the framework of the Solidarity in Times of Crisis (SOCRIS) project in which one of the authors was involved[1]. The survey's target population was economically active and aged 18–65 years, regardless of citizenship. People in training, retirement, maternity leave, or for other reasons not working for a long period of time, were deliberately excluded; however, unemployed people were included. The contact data were randomly selected from public registries and from a contact database created and maintained by the polling institute to compensate for missing entries in the public registry. The sample using these registries was conducted as a quota selection based on age, gender, and region, copying a distribution provided by the federal statistics institute. For this, step by step during the survey period participants were filtered out if certain quota, e.g., for age groups, had already been fulfilled. The survey was conducted in German, hence there is an unintended bias due to language skills. The realized sample size is 1,004 participants. For the analysis, unweighted data were used as the main research questions primarily concern correlation rather than distribution. The survey data are available via the GESIS data archive[2]. Due to the quota sample design and lack of information on the response rate, claims beyond the survey population are restricted, which will be reflected in the description and the analysis by referring mainly to the survey participants and not to the Austrian population as a whole.

With data collection ending with September 2017, the survey covers the period shortly before the general election of 2017, which resulted in a conservative/right-wing coalition government formed by the Austrian People's Party (ÖVP) and the Freedom Party of Austria (FPÖ) that lasted for two years. The short timespan before election day enabled the opinions and attitudes to be gathered that may have led to the final election decision. Hence, a certain overlap between the survey and the respective part of the electoral population is assumed.

For an overview of the sample population, see table 12 in the appendix. The last columns show data from the Labor Market Information System (AMIS) provided by the Federal Ministry of Labor and Economy and the Labor Force Survey by Statistics Austria. Overall, the sample survey structure is close to the distribution by the AMIS and the Labor Force Survey; there are, however, some notable deviations. The lower number of non-Austrian citizens within the survey population is, we expect, mainly due to the language used for conducting the survey, German. Fewer people with an apprenticeship and more with a medium- and higher-level technical or vocational school diploma participated in the survey compared to the distribution in the Labor Force Survey. Also, the share of people who indicated they were self-employed within the survey population is larger than the Statistics Austria data. On the other hand, the unemployment rate and distribution between full- and part-time is similar to the Labor Force Survey data.

1 In addition, Saskja Schindler, Carina Altreiter, and Istvàn Grajczjar have been lead members when it comes to the empirical research within the SOCRIS project.

2 https://search.gesis.org/research_data/SDN-10.7802-2291?doi=10.7802/2291 (last accessed April 10, 2023).

Operationalizing and Measuring Multidimensional Solidarity

The research question poses two challenges regarding the operationalization of the solidarity items. First, it should not reduce solidarity to a form of solidarity vs. non-solidarity and second, solidarity should not be reduced to one aspect, e.g., welfare state support, global, but should rather combine the varying elements. Initial attempts to construct three theoretically informed solidarity types with the survey data proved unsuccessful. Especially the third type, lack of solidarity, was unconvincing and misleading as rightfully pointed out by the reviewers of this article. This also informed the decision to focus on two types, universal and exclusive solidarity. For the two types considered, we refer to four different dimensions of solidarity, which will be described here in more detail.

a) Institutional Solidarity in the Form of Welfare State Support

Due to the generally high approval rate of the welfare state in Austria, as Grausgruber (2019) recently analyzed, the operationalization does not focus on the rejection or acceptance of the welfare state but on the way welfare support is tied to certain terms and conditions. The Austrian welfare state incorporates (at least) two ways to claim welfare support—either based on previous contributions (mainly insurance e.g., unemployment, retirement) or demand-based (e.g., basic income, free education). These form different types of solidarity, namely solidarity that must be earned vs. solidarity granted if needed. The first fits the notion of *exclusive* and the latter of *universal* solidarity.

b) Labor Market Favoritism due to Citizenship

Opinions on the regulation of the Austrian labor market for non-Austrian (or more prominently non-EU) citizens express different solidarity positions by the different actors involved. Restricted access for noncitizens or favoring Austrian/European workers when hiring or firing may aim to strengthen the rights, opportunities, and privileges of Austrian workers by excluding migrants from workers' solidarity. Following Dörre (2018) and Flecker et al. (2018), this forms a kind of *exclusive* solidarity that has been strongly favored by right-wing parties since the 1990s.

However, unrestricted access to the labor market does not necessarily equal universal solidarity. Demands for unrestricted access to the labor market can also stem from the desire for better access to (what are anticipated to be cheaper) labor forces (see e.g., Hödl et al. 2000: 32 ff.). Solidarity is not aimed for here. On the contrary, it may even be intended to weaken workers' solidarity on the national level.

However, better access to the labor market can nevertheless also imply inclusive or *universal* solidarity—an inclusion of migrant workers in the historically hard-won workers' solidarity in Austria, not just for the migrants' sake but with mutual benefits. The chosen formulation of the question within the survey—"When jobs are scarce, employers should give priority to Austrians over immigrants"–aims to differentiate between an exclusive and a universal type of solidarity.

c) Support for Socially Vulnerable Groups (the Long-Term Unemployed and Refugees)

In 2017, the support granted for refugees was and still is limited to satisfying fundamental needs. Demanding more support for refugees can be seen as *universal* solidarity. On the other hand, demanding less support strengthens *exclusive* solidarity. Regarding support for long-term unemployed people, here the differences between universal and exclusive solidarity is less clear. Exclusive solidarity does not necessarily exclude the long-term unemployed if they are not classified as an "other." However, as previous studies show, if associated with a racialized "other" or otherwise racially charged (see e.g., Gilens 1995; Schadauer 2022) or seen as self-inflicted or unwilling to work (van Oorschot 2000) it can inform an exclusive stance, but this does not have to be the case. For this analysis we nevertheless see support for the long-term unemployed as an indicator of *universal* and no support as an indicator of *exclusive* solidarity[3].

d) Global Solidarity

Solidarity beyond the nation state is translated here into a demand for regular payments and support by countries profiting from global social inequality even at the cost of individual expenses. Approval is seen as a kind of *universal* and rejection as *exclusive* solidarity.

3 That this approach may not be feasible for constructing a solidarity scale is also supported by the reliability analysis discussed later.

Dimension	Questions
Institutional solidarity in the form of contribution-based welfare state support	Only those who pay taxes and contributions should receive social benefits.*
Labor market favoritism due to citizenship	When jobs are scarce, employers should give priority to Austrians over immigrants.*
Support for socially vulnerable groups or lack thereof	To what extent would you say the state should provide more help to the groups listed below to improve their situation, where 3 means that the government should give more help, 2 means the same level of help, and 1 means the government should give less help? Includes refugees and the long-term unemployed
Global redistribution	People in rich countries should pay an additional tax to help people in poor countries.*

*Answers: 1 totally disagree, 2 disagree, 3 neither nor, 4 agree, 5 totally agree.

Table 1 Overview: dimension of and questions regarding the solidarity variables used to construct the two types of solidarity.

As one reviewer rightly pointed out, this operationalization does not address all meanings of solidarity as outlined by Scholz (2015). Instead, it mainly focuses on institutional or civic solidarity. It also does not include the items used within the European Value Study regarding concerns for different groups of people (Lomazzi 2021). However, these items are deliberately excluded. We mainly considered items that explicitly formulate demands or calls for action. As argued before, in most empirical studies reviewed for this article besides the European Value Study, solidarity items are more action- or demand-oriented than the explanatory attitude or ideology items. We follow this approach as we also see it as necessary to demarcate the solidarity from the ideology items in this way. We further included the questions about concern for the living conditions of people in different parts of the world as explanatory items possibly informing solidarity. We also excluded two items from the questionnaire regarding people receiving the minimum pension and families with many children as they received nearly unanimous support and hence cannot be used to distinguish between these two types of solidarity. Additional possible questions on solidarity had to be excluded from the survey due to the limited budget.

For the next step, the approval and rejection of these items are used to deduce possible tendencies toward two different types of solidarity based on the literature. The function of solidarity as described by Stjernø (2005) was considered to differentiate between *exclusive* (strengthening certain groups or communities) and universal solidarity (improving society) in general. *Exclusivity* and *inclusivity* are also features of solidarity in their own right as the literature on the political far right prominently points out (Dörre 2018; Flecker et al. 2018). Solidarity may additionally be oriented *transnationally*, as described by Beckert et al. (2004) and Nowicka et al. (2019), further strengthening its *universal* characteristics.

This makes it possible to construct the two types of solidarity—universal and exclusive—or rather tendencies toward them. The two types are constructed via combinations of answers. For example, agreeing that welfare support should be tied exclusively to prior contributions is used as an indicator of exclusive solidarity. Disagreeing is seen as indicating universal solidarity. Respondents agreeing to this question received one point counting toward exclusive solidarity; respondents disagreeing received one point counting toward universal solidarity. This was done for all five questions. Demanding more support for refugees was used as an indicator of universal solidarity. Respondents demanding more support were hence awarded one point toward universal solidarity and so forth. As a last step, the assigned points were added up, leading to two separate scales leading to two ideal types of solidarity ranging from zero to five points each: zero for those who completely rejected and five for those who completely agreed upon each indicator for the specific type of solidarity, and many variations in between. Hence, the two scales are constructed based on theoretical considerations and not outcomes of statistical analyses, e.g., cluster analyses. In addition, the way the solidarity items are constructed means that exclusive and universal solidarity can be seen as ideal types, which most participants do not fully support or fall into. With this approach, we do not so much analyze the types themselves, but tendencies toward these ideal types.

	Universal	Exclusive
Dimension		
Contribution-based welfare state support	Disagree *(collectivist)*	Agree *(collectivist)*
Labor market favoritism	Disagree *(no group orientation)*	Agree *(group orientation)*
Support for socially vulnerable groups	*(inclusive, improve society)*	*(exclusive)*
Refugees	More	Less
The long-term unemployed	More	Less
Global redistribution	Agree (transnational)	Disagree *(national)*

Table 2 Construction of the two types of solidarity. The answers have been combined: totally disagree and disagree have been merged as "disagree," totally agree and agree as "agree." The range of the two solidarity variables is zero to five.

Other approaches are possible to create different types of solidarities, with cluster analysis being the most common. We decided against a cluster analysis for the following reasons. A thorough cluster analysis would shift the focus of the article away from the ideological foundation and toward the quality and validity of the clusters themselves. In addition, a cluster analysis would also shift the focus away from tendencies to ideal types of solidarity and toward mutually exclusive types of solidarity. The theoretically informed types used here makes it possible to address solidarity more as a continuum and composition of different aspects of solidarity, as discussed before. The main interest of this article is to discuss the tendencies toward possible types of solidarity and not so much the different types of solidarity alone. This makes it possible to address what conditions nudge the survey participants toward these two end points of this continuum of solidarity even if they do not fully support these types of solidarity. A full cluster analysis to identify different types of solidarities and combinations of solidarity items would be interesting in its own right, but here it would distract from the main focus of the study.

Having said this, we did conduct a factor and reliability analysis to gain more information on the interrelation of the used items (see tables 13 to 14 and figure 1 in the appendix). For both, we used a dichotomized version of the items following the theoretical compositions discussed above. For the reliability analysis, the Kuder-Richardson statistic shows a rather low reliability, with 0.51 for universal and 0.60 for exclusive solidarity. For both, the exclusion of the item on global redistribution would increase the overall reliability, though only by 0.02 points. The reliable analysis also includes a scale for exclusive solidarity not used with demand for more instead of less support for the long-term unemployed, as this was an option discussed above. Here the Kuder-Richardson statistics would be reduced to 0.38.

The factor analysis shows a KMO of 0.67 for universal and 0.71 for exclusive solidarity, with Bartlett's test for sphericity significant for both, making the used items suitable but not ideal for a factor analysis according to Backhaus et al. (2021: 431 f.). Based on the Eigenvalue, the number of factors suggested for both solidarity items is one, with an Eigenvalue below one for the second factor in both cases. The scree plot also supports a one-factor solution though shows a rather uncommon progression. For universal solidarity one factor explains 38.8% and for exclusive 41.47% of the variance. However, the one-factor solution leads to half of the residuals in the reproduced correlation table being above 0.05 for universal solidarity, making a multiple-factor solution also possible. For exclusive solidarity, just two of the residuals are above 0.05, making a one-factor solution rather feasible.

Although neither the reliability nor the factor analysis is absolutely conclusive whether a one-factor solution is the best approach, we nevertheless interpret the outcome to be a feasible option going forward following the theoretical considerations discussed above. This said, the two types of solidarity as constructed here in their most distinct or ideal-typical forms based on the theoretical allocations can be described as follows:

- Universal solidarity advocates for more support for all those considered socially vulnerable (inclusive, improve society). It does not favor workers due to their nationality (no-group orientation) and does not tie social benefits to preceding contributions (collective, inclusive). It also demands global redistribution (transnational).

- Exclusive solidarity strongly differentiates between who should receive what support. It favors a particular group of workers demarcated by nationality (group orientation) and demands less support for the long-term unemployed and for refugees (exclusive). It also ties social benefits to prior contributions (collective, exclusive) and rejects support for poorer countries (non-transnational).

This construction of the scale and tendencies toward these two types of solidarity comes with one central feature. Except for cases with zero or five points, they rather represent possible tendencies toward a certain ideal type of solidarity. Just in the most distinct form when reaching full points, could they be seen as different ideal types of solidarity. Hence the following analysis is not so much based upon types of solidarity but tendencies toward them.

Independent Variables and Hypothesis

In the empirical analysis, the different types of solidarity are explained with reference to socioeconomic characteristics and ideology variables. The ideology variables and the hypothesis informing the analysis will be explained in more detail here. Five different ideologies are addressed in the analysis. A strong focus on performance, or success ideology, is represented by ideas equating hard work with success. This is similar to the "success ideology" concept by Kluegel and Miyano (1995). Social dominance orientation, or the desire for a strong social stratification (Stewart/Pratto 2015) and authoritarian views (Kemmelmeier 2015) expressed in favor of strong leaders and discipline, are included as independent variables. Another ideology variable expresses nationalism. Here we follow Kosterman and Feshachs' (1989) early study differentiating between patriotism and nationalism in empirical survey studies. Nationalism is seen as a view of superiority or absolute supremacy of one's own nation over other nations, which is expressed in the two used items. The last ideology indicator refers to racism. We use the label racism instead of xenophobia based on its conceptualization within the current research literature as a mechanism or relation of social power (see for example Schadauer 2022; Terkessidis 2018). Highlighting the aspect of social power decouples the concept of racism from the assigned distinguishing feature, namely a biological notion of "race," and points to the arbitrary symbolic construction of an "us" and an "other." This follows the relevant discussions on racism without race, neo-racism, race as a floating signifier, and racism before race (Balibar 2016; Hall 2016; Rommelspacher 2009; Terkessidis 2004). In this respect, although the survey questions use the seemingly descriptive attribution "immigrant," they rely on discourses symbolically charging this attribution beyond a neutral descriptive. This is especially the case when it comes to the topics addressed by the used question—crime and social and economic contribution. Here, the label "immigrant" does not necessarily entail all non-Austrian citizens but mainly immigrants deemed as non-Western as they are the focal point of media, social, and political discourses (Opratko 2019; Schadauer/Schäfer 2019; Faist 1995). For the item descriptions and measures of association, see table 7 in the appendix[4].

In other empirical approaches (e.g., Grajczjár et al. 2022) these items, especially nationalism and racism, are treated as aspects of solidarity. Following the previously established distinction between attitudes, ideologies, or worldviews and demands or calls for action, with the latter as more adequately representing solidarity, when it comes to the survey questions we treat these as separate. Certain attitudes or ideologies may lead to certain types of solidarity but not necessarily and consistently, as the following analysis of the connection between ideologies and the two solidarity types will also show.

The influence of the ideology variable is analyzed by multiple linear regression models (Miles/Shevlin 2001; Allison 1999). To address the impact of ideology in contrast to other possible influences, several models have been calculated. The first model includes the socioeconomic background (education level and income [5]) and subjective assessment of the household's

4 The descriptions of the independent items and the tables in the appendix have also been used for another article based on the SOCRIS data, but on a different topic and with different dependent variables (Schadauer 2022).

5 Surveyed as household income but included as weighted by household size and z-standardized. Due to a high number of non-responses on the questions on income, this has been compensated for by applying multiple imputations. The missing income values have been estimated based on age, gender, size of household, education, past and expected financial development of the household, and assessment of the household's financial situation. The imputation using SPSS is based on linear regressions with 20 imputations, 100 iterations, and a tolerance value of 10E-12. It is used for the test for singularity (Wang/Johnson 2019).

financial situation. The second includes political alienation and the perceived social position of one's own class or profession. The third contains the ideology variables. A fourth model incorporates concern for the living conditions of people in different parts of the world. These are stand-in variables for *sense of belonging,* which, for some authors, plays an important role as a precondition for solidarity (see e.g., Bayertz 1998).

As argued before, solidarity is seen as embedded in different ideologies more or less compatible with the different principles of solidarity. Therefore, different connections between the type of solidarities and ideologies are assumed. These form the hypotheses underlying the following analysis:

- A strong focus on performance and accomplishments may foster tendencies toward exclusive as opposed to universal solidarity.
- We expect tendencies toward exclusive solidary stances to positively correlate with the success ideology, as it is used as a demarcation line for legitimizing or delegitimizing access to social resources.
- Authoritarian, nationalist, and racist ideologies may support tendencies toward exclusive and hinder tendencies toward universal solidarity.
- Social dominance orientation is expected to suppress tendencies toward universal and support tendencies toward exclusive solidarity.

Based on the discussed empirical literature (Nowicka et al. 2019; Grausgruber 2019; Maggini 2018; Hjorth 2016; Harell et al. 2016; Denz 2003; Corneo/Grüner 2002; van Oorschot 2000; Gilens 1995; Kluegel et al. 1995), we also expect the ideology variables to contribute more to the goodness of fit of the regression model compared to the socioeconomic variables. Table 3 illustrates the hypothesized relations between the different types of solidarity and the various ideologies.

	Solidarity	
	Universal	Exclusive
Focus on performance	–	+
Social dominance orientation	–	+
Authoritarianism	–	+
Nationalism	–	+
Racism	–	+

Table 3 Hypothesis: ideology and types of solidarity

To address possible problematic multicollinearities of the independent variables, table 8 in the appendix shows their Pearson correlation coefficients. The highest coefficient with .60 is given for the variables on the concern for the living conditions of Europeans and the concern for the living conditions of people living outside of the European Union. To control whether this points toward a possible extreme multicollinearity, table 9 in the appendix provides information about the tolerance and variance inflation factor (VIF). Both are close to the critical value suggested by Allison (1999: 140 f.)—tolerance above 0.4 and VIF below 2.50—but still tolerable. Deleting one variable would reduce the multicollinearity, but as they address different and relevant topics and are informative in their own right, we decided to keep them in the regression analysis. All the other variables show no concerning multicollinearity[6].

Distribution of Universal and Exclusive Solidarity

Table 4 shows the distribution of the items used for composing the two possible tendencies toward ideal types of solidarity. Nearly half of the survey population prefers contribution-based welfare support and labor market favoritism (agree and strongly agree taken together). Both are expressions of exclusive solidarity. Global redistribution is rejected by just over a third of the survey population, which is attributed to exclusive solidarity. Expressions of universal solidarity, on the other hand, are less pronounced overall. Within the three topics of *contribution-based welfare support, labor market favoritism*, and *global redistribution*, around a third can be assigned to universal solidarity. For all three variables, it is noticeable that the margins are less pronounced than the center. Strong stances on these three subjects are rather uncommon within the survey population.

This is also the case for the two questions on support for socially vulnerable groups. Around 48% were in favor of keeping the support at the level put into effect in 2017. Fewer argued for more support for both groups than for less support and this is more distinct for refugees than for the long-term unemployed.

6 These tables have also been used for another article (Schadauer 2022) using the SOCRIS data. As they are relevant and informative for both studies, we reproduced them here.

Name	Strongly disagree	Disagree	Neither agree nor disagree	Agree	Strongly agree	N
Contribution-based welfare state support	6.3%	23.7%	22%	29.7%	18.3%	973
Labor market favoritism	8.6%	23.5%	22.5%	30.8%	14.6%	979
Global redistribution	8%	26.8%	19%	21.5%	14.7%	1004
Support for socially vulnerable groups						
	Less	The same	More	N		
The long-term unemployed	28.3%	47.3%	24.3%	1004		
Refugees	30.5%	48%	20.9%	1004		

Table 4 Distribution of solidarity variables, row percent

Table 5 shows the two tendencies toward the two ideal types of solidarity as operationalized. 3% of the survey population can be classified as having internalized a full universal solidarity attitude. 6.1% answered four and 11.4% three of the five questions corresponding to this dimension. 25.5% gave no responses that could be declared to represent universal solidarity in this study. Regarding exclusive solidarity, slightly more, 5.1%, answered all the questions in this direction. However, 9.8% answered four and 17.5% answered three questions accordingly. 20.3% answered none of the questions classified as exclusive in the described sense. Hence slightly more of the participants tend toward exclusive than toward universal solidarity, with 9.1% taking two and 20.5% claiming three of the items attributed to universal solidarity together vs. 14.9% and 32.4% for exclusive solidarity.

	Forms of solidarity (in %)	
	Universal	Exclusive
0 not at all	25.5	23.8
1	32.7	23.5
2	21.4	20.3
3	11.4	17.5
4	6.1	9.8
5 completely	3	5.1
Sum	100%	100.0
N	1004	1004

Table 5 Distribution within the survey population—universal and exclusive solidarity

Not surprisingly based on their composition, the two types of solidarity are correlated. With a significant Pearson correlation coefficient (r = -0.62), *universal* and *exclusive* solidarity can be seen as antipodes. They point in different directions but do not simply form two endpoints on a straight line.

What Influences Universal and Exclusive Solidarity?

Starting with universal solidarity, we first address the question of whether sociodemographic and socioeconomic data can be used to explain tendencies toward it. For the socioeconomic variables, neither income nor the evaluation of the household income show significant influence on the universal solidarity scale as constructed (see table 10 in the appendix). Formal education is significant only in the first two models and in the direction leading to a more distinct universal solidarity. When including ideologies, however, the coefficient is reduced to being insignificant on the five percent level (beta = .03 in model 4). Of the socioeconomic variables, only the expected development of household income is classified as significant in all four models (beta = .07 in the fourth model). A more positive view of the future financial situation of the household may in small part support the tendency toward a clearer universal solidarity attitude.

Including political alienation and assessment of the position of class/profession leads to a slight improvement in the model (from R2 = .02 to R2 = .09). A strong feeling of political alienation negatively impacts the tendency toward universal solidarity within the survey population, while the feeling or appreciation of one's own class/profession slightly fosters it.

However, the coefficient for both is strongly reduced when ideologies are considered. The inclusion of variables for focus on performance, social dominance orientation, authoritarianism, nationalism, and racism reduces the impact of the variables on political alienation from beta = -.21 to -.07 and the assessment of the social position of one's own class/profession from beta = .09 to .04. In the fourth model, both are no longer calculated as significant.

The noticeably high drop in the coefficient for political alienation suggests that alienation is strongly tied to ideologies and especially to focus on performance, social dominance orientation, and racism. All three show a negative effect on tendencies toward universal solidarity, with racism as the strongest influence. Racist ideologies (beta = -.33 in model 4), and to a lesser extent also focus on performance (beta = -.15), hinder a fully developed sense of universal solidarity. The influence of social dominance orientation is reduced to statistical insignificance (beta = -.07) when introducing the variables on feelings of concern for the living conditions of people in different parts of the world. Nationalism and authoritarianism are not recognized as significant at all.

Hence, within the survey population, two to three of the assumed relations between ideology and possible tendencies toward universal solidarity could be confirmed. Tendencies toward universal solidarity are strongly defined by rejecting an ideology agonistically separating between an "us" and an "other" and that success is mainly tied to effort and performance. It is also in small part influenced by not striving for social segregation. Furthermore, compared to the previously added variables, the inclusion of the ideology variables substantially increases the goodness of fit of the regression model (R2 = .31). Of the variables for sense of responsibility, concern for the living conditions of people outside of Europe shows a significant positive effect (beta = .17) and very slightly decreases the effect of the ideology variables.

Is this also the case for exclusive solidarity? The tendency toward a fully developed exclusive solidarity within the survey population is significantly and directly influenced by income and education even when including all further variables (see table 11 in the appendix). Higher income is connected to more distinct exclusive solidarity attitudes (beta = .10 for model four), though weakly. Higher formal education, on the other hand, reduces tendencies toward exclusive solidarity. The influence of formal education is more pronounced within the first model (beta = -.21) and successively limited with the addition of further variables (beta = -.06 for model 4).

Similar to the regression models on universal solidarity, political alienation starts with a high coefficient when introduced (beta = .21) and declines as ideology variables are added (beta = .06). However, it remains significant and supports tendencies toward exclusive solidarity even when all the other variables are included. Two of the ideology variables are calculated as having a significant effect. Racializing ideologies show the overall strongest influence on tendencies toward exclusive solidarity (beta = .32), but a pronounced social dominance orientation (beta = .13) also increases these tendencies toward full exclusive solidarity opinions. Hence, both point in the theoretically assumed direction. Focus on performance, authoritarianism, and nationalism show no effect at all. The inclusion of the ideology variables strongly increases the goodness of fit of the regression model (from R2 = .11 for the second to R2 = .32 for the third model). Concern for the living conditions of people outside of Europe is negatively (beta = -.20) related and for compatriots positively connected to tendencies toward exclusive solidarity (beta = .11) and its addition also slightly reduces the effect of the ideology variables.

	Solidarity	
	Universal	Exclusive
Focus on performance	-	n.s.
Social dominance orientation	-	+
Authoritarianism	n.s.	n.s.
Nationalism	n.s.	n.s.
Racism	-	+

Table 6 Influence of ideologies on the two types of solidarity. n.s. = not significant.

Discussion

Universal and exclusive solidarity, as constructed here, combine different dimensions of solidarity (regarding socially vulnerable groups, conditionality of institutio-

nalized solidarity, strengthening of certain groups, and across borders/on a global scale). Each dimension is important in its own right. Combined, they allow solidarity to be addressed as a multidimensional phenomenon. However, in their clearest form, these types are rather rare among the participants. Rather, the survey population shows tendencies toward the two options of solidarity instead of clear and distinct positions. This underlines the discussion within the literature, which sees solidarity as rather fluid, flexible, and alternating (see e.g., Altreiter et al. 2019; Börner 2018). In its concrete form, it is hard to pinpoint certain aggregations of solidary attitudes. Solidarity in one respect, e.g., with socially vulnerable groups, does not automatically lead to solidarity in another, e.g., on a global scale. The combinations are manifold within the survey population. Our analysis therefore switches from concepts of *solidarity* and *non-solidarity* to possible tendencies toward different ideal types of solidarity and influences on these tendencies. These tendencies are differently fostered or hindered by socioeconomic and political conditions, but especially by given ideologies.

Due to the positive impact of higher income on tendencies toward exclusive solidarity, it can be explained as measures to preserve rather than to improve one's position and social status within the survey population. This counters arguments about exclusive solidarity as a means mainly for alleged "losers of modernization" as is also criticized by Hofmann (2016).

For tendencies toward exclusive solidarity, the significant ideology and "concern" variables stress notions that distinguish strongly between a favored "us" vs. the "other," further cemented by approval of social stratification. A racializing ideology combined with a social dominance orientation form the ideological basis for exclusive solidarity or, here, tendencies toward exclusive solidarity, which is in line with other studies (Harell et al. 2016; Gilens 1995). In contrast to Denz (2003) and Maggini (2018), the influence of authoritarianism could not be reproduced. Also, the use of performance principles to legitimate exclusion is much less and insignificantly pronounced. This stands in opposition to arguments that exclusive solidarity is mainly based on the notion of previous achievements: it counters the argument that the preference for exclusive solidarity as constructed here is derivative of a performance orientation or success ideology, with e.g., the basic assumption that people born in Austria earned their privileges through hard work as brought forward especially in the policy arena (for more on this, see Friedrich 2012; Faist 1995). The ideological basis for tendencies toward full exclusive solidarity within the survey population is based on constructions of belonging, notions of worth due to alleged origin and birth, i.e., status principles, which, even in contemporary societies, function as legitimation for discrimination and maintaining social segregation (e.g., Hall 2016; Hund 2010).

The ideological foundation for tendencies toward full universal solidarity stands in opposition to tendencies toward the ideal type of exclusive solidarity. A racist ideology is the main contrasting factor between the tendencies toward universal and exclusive solidarity. In line with this, a sense of global community also distinguishes these tendencies between the two ideal types of solidarity. Concerns for the living conditions of people outside of Europe are directly opposed to each other between the tendencies toward these two solidarity ideal types. However, while for tendencies toward exclusive solidarity this is accompanied by a strong concern for the people within Austria, for tendencies toward universal solidarity there is no significant difference between either the Austrian or the European level. For tendencies toward universal solidarity, concern for people outside of Europe can be seen as an addition to concerns for people living in Austria and in Europe and not as a replacement. Within the survey population, tendencies toward universal solidarity are ideologically defined by anti-racism and a rejection of a performance ideology, but also, although rather weakly, of ideologies endorsing social stratification. In addition, a positive economic future prospect for the respondent's household and a higher level of formal education also fosters tendencies toward universal solidarity demands and positions, but as the influence is rather weak and income does not show any impact, it does not necessarily support arguments classifying universal solidarity as "fair-weather solidarity."

In general, the assumption that tendencies toward ideal types of solidarity are driven and formed by ideologies rather than socioeconomic positions could be confirmed for both ideal types, exclusive and universal solidarity alike. Within both regression models, the contribution of ideology to the goodness of fit is much higher than the socioeconomic and demographic data.

Conclusion

This paper makes several contributions to the literature on solidarity. First, while the theoretical literature by and large stresses the multidimensional character of solidarity, the quantitative empirical research so far has focused on single dimensions alone. By combining several dimensions into two types of solidarity, this paper offers a unique approach on how to connect the theoretical literature with quantitative studies. With this, it aligns the empirical more closely with the theoretical analysis. Second, also following the literature, it does not reduce solidarity to a solidarity vs. non-solidarity option but differentiates between tendencies toward ideal types of universal and exclusive solidarity.

Third, by including different ideologies at the same time, it offers a more comprehensive analysis on how solidarity is linked to the perception of grouping, belonging, and deservingness. Here, ideologies are not relegated to an ancillary status or an afterthought. By not singling out one type of ideology, this paper also addresses how different ideologies together form a foundation for possible tendencies toward different types of solidarity.

However, there are also several limitations to be acknowledged. In the survey data, solidarity is solely based on attitudes and not on actions. Also, more than two forms of solidarity could be imagined and have been addressed in previous publications (Grajczjár et al. 2019, 2022; Altreiter et al. 2019). However, the two types constructed here are, on the one hand, general but also, on the other, specific enough so that they can be linked to the discussed theories of solidarity (especially Stjernø 2005). Focusing on tendencies toward two types also allowed for a more extensive concentration on and identification of the possible foundations of solidarity. A larger number of solidarity types would have further complicated the construction process and analysis. Further research should refine and maybe expand the types of solidarity analyzed especially towards non-solidarity, which was excluded here. Moreover, the concepts of exclusive and universal solidarity also demand constant adaptions and should not be seen as final.

Focusing on multidimensional ideological influences on solidarity within empirical studies allows research to address topics not otherwise accessible. This is important, as solidarity remains a crucial social force shaping political, social, and economic processes and ideologies form a central source for the different types of solidarity. The latter also form a possible gateway into the very core of solidarity, making it accessible for promotion, but also vulnerable to manipulation with ever-shifting delimitations. Within the policy arena, exclusive solidarity can easily be used to denounce solidarity overall, for example by denouncing welfare support in general as allegedly mainly benefitting "foreigners" or the "useless others" (Schadauer 2022; Friedrich 2012). On the other hand, the absence of racist, authoritarian, and nationalist ideologies informing universal solidarity can also be abused for something Kymlicka (2015: 7) critically labeled "neoliberal multiculturalism" denoting an "inclusion without solidarity." Here, the rejection of a "performance must be rewarded" ideology makes quite a difference in separating non-solidarity inclusion from universal solidarity—a difference that should not go unnoticed.

The overlaps but at the same time stark contrasts between universal and exclusive solidarity are challenges for society in general but also for social and political movements. They have the potential to create social tensions and divisions. If at least partly rooted in rigid ideologies as suggested here, they may go deep and may become insurmountable. This must also be thoroughly addressed in order to be able to identify and avoid what Scholz (2015: 733) describes as the "disturbing negative facet [of solidarity] in the form of nationalism, xenophobia, and capitalist hegemony." To prevent solidarity developing in this way, what informs and nourishes this type of solidarity has to be made visible and challenged on a regular basis, among other reasons to avoid casting a damning light on solidarity in general.

Literature

Allison, P. D. (1999): Multiple Regression: A Primer. Thousand Oaks/CA: Pine Forge Press.

Altreiter, C./Flecker, J./Papouschek, U./Schindler, S./Schönauer, A. (2019): Umkämpfte Solidaritäten: Spaltungslinien in der Gegenwartsgesellschaft. Vienna: Promedia.

Arndt, C. (2018): White-Collar Unions and Attitudes towards Income Inequality, Redistribution, and State–Market Relations. European Sociological Review, 34 (6), 675–693.

Backhaus, K./Erichson, B./Gensler, S./Weiber, R./Weiber, T. (2021): Multivariate Analysis: An Application-Oriented Introduction. Wiesbaden [Heidelberg]: Springer Gabler

Balibar, É. (2016): Gibt es einen 'Neo-Rassismus'? In: Kimmich, D./Lavorano, S./Bergmann, F. (eds.): Was ist Rassismus? Kritische Texte. Stuttgart: Reclam, 23–31.

Bayertz, K. (1998): Begriff und Problem der Solidarität. In: Bayertz, K. (ed.): Solidarität: Begriff und Problem. Frankfurt/M.: Suhrkamp, 11–53.

Beckert, J./Eckert, J./Kohli, M./Streek, W. (eds.) (2004): Einleitung. In: Transnationale Solidarität: Chancen und Grenzen. Frankfurt/M., New York: Campus, 9–14.

Börner, S. (2018): Strittige Solidarität. Zur Elastizität von Solidaritätskonstruktionen in den deutschen und britischen Arbeiterunterstützungskassen des 19. Jahrhunderts. Zeitschrift für Sozialreform, 64 (1), 23–49.

Corneo, G./Grüner, H. P. (2002): Individual Preferences for Political Redistribution. Journal of Public Economics, 83 (1), 83–107.

Denz, H. (2003): Solidarität in Österreich. Strukturen und Trends. SWS-Rundschau, 43 (3).

Dörre, K. (2018): In der Warteschlange. Rassismus, völkischer Populismus und die Arbeiterfrage. In: Becker, K./Dörre, K./Reif-Spirek, P. (eds.): Arbeiterbewegung von rechts? Ungleichheit-Verteilungskämpfe-populistische Revolte. Frankfurt/M.: Campus, 49–79.

Durkheim, É. (2016): Über soziale Arbeitsteilung: Studie über die Organisation höherer Gesellschaften. 7th edition. Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp.

Faist, T. (1995): Ethnicization and Racialization of Welfare-state Politics in Germany and the USA. Ethnic and Racial Studies, 18 (2), 219–250.

Flecker, J./Altreiter, C./Schindler, S. (2018): Erfolg des Rechtspopulismus durch exkludierende Solidarität? In: Becker, K./Dörre, K./Reif-Spirek, P. (eds.): Arbeiterbewegung von rechts? Ungleichheit-Verteilungskämpfe-populistische Revolte. Frankfurt/M.: Campus, 245–255.

Friedrich, S. (2012): Die diskursive Erschaffung des 'nutzlosen Anderen'. Zur Verschränkung von Einwanderungs- und Unterschichtendiskurs. In: Jäger, M./Kauffmann, H. (eds.): Skandal und doch normal: Impulse für eine antirassistische Praxis. Münster: Unrast, 96–111.

Gerhards, J./Lengfeld, H./Ignácz, Z./Kley, F. K./Priem, M. (2019): European Solidarity in Times of Crisis: Insights from a Thirteen-Country Survey. New York: Routledge.

Gilens, M. (1995): Racial Attitudes and Opposition to Welfare. The Journal of Politics, 57 (4), 994–1014.

Grajczjár, I./Nagy, Z./Örkény, A. (2019): Different Types of Solidarity in Times of Crises. Intersections, 5 (1). https://doi.org/10.17356/ieejsp.v5i1.475

Grajczjár, I./Nagy, Z./Örkény, A. (2022): Types of Solidarity in a Hybrid Regime: The Hungarian Case. Government and Opposition, 57 (4), 610–629.

Grausgruber, A. (2019): Einstellungen zum Wohlfahrtsstaat in Österreich. In: Bacher, J./Grausgruber, A./Haller, M./Höllinger, F./Prandner, D./Verwiebe, R. (eds.): Sozialstruktur und Wertewandel in Österreich: Trends 1986–2016. Wiesbaden: Springer VS, 457–481.

Große Kracht, H.-J. (2017): Solidarität und Solidarismus: Postliberale Suchbewegungen zur normativen Selbstverständigung moderner Gesellschaften. Bielefeld: Transcript.

Hall, S. (1986): The Problem of Ideology-Marxism without Guarantees. Journal of Communication Inquiry, 10 (2), 28–44.

Hall, S. (2016): Rassismus als ideologischer Diskurs. In: Kimmich, D./Lavorano, S./Bergmann, F. (eds.): Was ist Rassismus? Kritische Texte. Stuttgart: Reclam, 172–188.

Hall, S. (2021): Selected Writings on Race and Difference. Durham/NC: Duke University Press.

Harell, A./Soroka, S./Iyengar, S. (2016): Race, Prejudice and Attitudes toward Redistribution: A Comparative Experimental Approach. European Journal of Political Research, 55 (4), 723–744.

Hjorth, F. (2016): Who Benefits? Welfare Chauvinism and National Stereotypes. European Union Politics, 17 (1), 3–24.

Hödl, G./Husa, K./Parnreiter, C./Stacher, I. (2000): Internationale Migration: Globale Herausforderung des 21. Jahrhunderts? In: Husa, K./Parnreiter, C./Stacher, I./Abou Chabake, T. A. (eds.): Internationale Migration: die globale Herausforderung des 21. Jahrhunderts? Frankfurt/M.: Brandes & Apsel, 9–24.

Hofmann, J. (2016): Abstiegsangst und Tritt nach unten? Die Verbreitung von Vorurteilen und die Rolle sozialer Unsicherheit bei der Entstehung dieser am Beispiel Österreichs. In: Aschauer, W./Donat, E./Hofmann, J. (eds.): Solidaritätsbrüche in Europa: Konzeptuelle Überlegungen und empirische Befunde. Europa – Politik – Gesellschaft. Wiesbaden: Springer VS, 237–258.

Hund, W. D. (2010): Negative Societalisation: Racism and the Constitution of Race. In: Hund, W. D./Krikler, J./Roediger, D. R. (eds.): Wages of Whiteness & Racist Symbolic Capital. Münster: LIT Verlag 57–96.

Kemmelmeier, M. (2015): Authoritarianism. In: Wright, J. D. (ed.): International Encyclopedia of the Social & Behavioral Sciences. Oxford: Elsevier, 262–268.

Kluegel, J. R./Miyano, M./Kluegel, J. R./Miyano, M. (1995): Justice Beliefs and Support for the Welfare State in Advanced Capitalism. In: Kluegel, J. R./Mason, D. S./Wegener, B. (eds.): Social Justice and Political Change Public Opinion in Capitalist and Post-Communist States. Berlin: De Gruyter, 81–106.

Kootstra, A. (2016): Deserving and Undeserving Welfare Claimants in Britain and the Netherlands: Examining the Role of Ethnicity and Migration Status Using a Vignette Experiment. European Sociological Review, 32 (3), 325–338.

Kosterman, R./Feshbach, S. (1989): Toward a Measure of Patriotic and Nationalistic Attitudes. Political Psychology, 10 (2), 257.

Kymlicka, W. (2015): Solidarity in Diverse Societies: Beyond Neoliberal Multiculturalism and Welfare Chauvinism. Comparative Migration Studies, 3 (1), 17.

Lahusen, C./Grasso, M. (eds.) (2018): Solidarity in Europe: Citizens' Responses in Times of Crisis. Cham: Palgrave Macmillan.

Lessenich, S./Reder, M./Süß, D. (2020): Zwischen sozialem Zusammenhalt und politischer Praxis: Die vielen Gesichter der Solidarität. WSI-Mitteilungen, 73 (5), 319–326.

Lomazzi, V. (2021): Can We Compare Solidarity across Europe? What, Why, When, and How to Assess Exact and Approximate Equivalence of First- and Second-Order Factor Models. Frontiers in Political Science, 3, 641698.

Maggini, N. (2018): The Social and Political Dimensions of Solidarity in Italy. In: Lahusen, C./Grasso, M. (eds.): Solidarity in Europe: Citizens' responses in times of crisis. Palgrave Studies in European Political Sociology. Cham: Palgrave Macmillan, 127–167.

Miles, J./Shevlin, M. (2001): Applying Regression & Correlation: A Guide for Students and Researchers. London, Thousand Oaks/CA: Sage Publications.

Nowicka, M./Krzyżowski, Ł./Ohm, D. (2019): Transnational Solidarity, the Refugees and Open Societies in Europe. Current Sociology, 67 (3), 383–400.

van Oorschot, W. (2000): Who Should Get What, and Why? On Deservingness Criteria and the Conditionality of Solidarity among the Public. Policy & Politics, 28 (1), 33–48.

Opratko, B. (2019): Im Namen der Emanzipation: Antimuslimischer Rassismus in Österreich. Bielefeld: Transcript.

Österle, A./Heitzmann, K. (2019): Austrification in Welfare System Change? An Analysis of Welfare System Developments in Austria between 1998 and 2018. In: Schubert, K. (ed.): Routledge Handbook of European Welfare Systems. London: Routledge, 21–37.

Prisching, M. (2011): Solidarität: Der vielschichtige Kitt gesellschaftlichen Zusammenlebens. In: Lessenich, S. (ed.): Wohlfahrtsstaatliche Grundbegriffe: historische und aktuelle Diskurse. Theorie und Gesellschaft. Frankfurt/M.: Campus-Verl, 157–190.

Rommelspacher, B. (2009): Was ist Rassismus? In: Melter, C./Mecheril, P. (eds.): Rassismuskritik: Rassismustheorie und -forschung. Schwalbach: Wochenschau, 25–38.

Schadauer, A. (2022): The Racialization of Welfare Support as Means to Further Welfare State Cutbacks: Spillover Effects in Survey Populations and Media Reports in Austria. Ethnic and Racial Studies, 45 (16), 308–334.

Schadauer, A./Schäfer, C. (2019): Online Fake News, Hateful Posts Against Refugees, and a Surge in Xenophobia and Hate Crimes in Austria. In: Dell'Orto, G./Wetzstein, I. (eds.): Refugee news, refugee politics: Journalism, public opinion and policymaking in Europe. New York: Routledge, 109–116.

Scholz, S. J. (2015): Seeking Solidarity. Philosophy Compass, 10 (10), 725–735.

Smith, C./Sorrell, K. (2014): On Social Solidarity. In: Jeffries, V. (ed.): Palgrave Handbook of Altruism, Morality, and Social Solidarity. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 219–247.

Stewart, A. L./Pratto, F. (2015): Social Dominance Orientation. In: Wright, J. D. (ed.): International Encyclopedia of the Social & Behavioral Sciences, 2nd ed. Oxford: Elsevier, 250–253.

Stjernø, S. (2005): Solidarity in Europe: The History of an Idea. Cambridge, New York: Cambridge University Press.

Svallfors, S. (1997): Worlds of Welfare and Attitudes to Redistribution: A Comparison of Eight Western Nations. European Sociological Review, 13 (3), 283–304.

Terkessidis, M. (2004): Die Banalität des Rassismus: Migranten zweiter Generation entwickeln eine neue Perspektive. Bielefeld: transcript.

Terkessidis, M. (2018): Rassismus definieren (1998/2017). In: Foroutan, N./Geulen, C./Illmer, S./Vogel, K./Wernsing, S. (eds.): Das Phantom "Rasse." Cologne: Böhlau, 65–82.

Wang, J./Johnson, D. E. (2019): An Examination of Discrepancies in Multiple Imputation Procedures Between SAS® and SPSS®. The American Statistician, 73 (1), 80–88.

Appendix

Dimensions	Items—Questions	N	Mean (standard deviation)	Pearson correlation r or Cronbach alpha
Focus on performance	Only people who work hard enough will get ahead in their work.	994	3.52 (1.15)	
Social dominance orientation (0–12)		947	5.51 (2.62)	
	Some people are just inferior to others.	973	3,13 (1.22)	Alpha = .61
	To get ahead in life, it is sometimes necessary to step on others.	994	2.96 (1.22)	
	It is probably a good thing that certain groups are at the top while others are at the bottom.	980	2.41 (1.05)	
Authoritarianism (0–12)		935	4.82 (2.73)	
	Obedience and respect for authority are the most important virtues children should learn.	989	3.29 (1.26)	Alpha = .69
	Most of our social problems would be solved if we could somehow get rid of antisocial people.	952	2.34 (1.06)	
	We need strong leaders who tell us what to do.	986	2.22 (1.15)	
Nationalism (0–8)		944	2.96 (1.87)	
	The world would be a better place if people from other countries were more like the Austrians.	958	2.57 (1.16)	r = .35
	People should support their country even if their country is wrong.	983	2.38 (1.15)	
Racism (0–8)		943	3.60 (1.89)	
	Immigrants increase crime rates in Austria.	975	2.76 (1.21)	r = -.39
	Immigrants contribute to the welfare of this country.*	960	3.17 (1.05)	

Table 7 *Overview: ideology items and scales. Response categories of the items: 1 = Strongly disagree, 2 = Disagree, 3 = Neither agree nor disagree, 4 = Agree, 5 = Strongly agree. The values of the ideology scales are given in brackets from lowest (not at all) to highest (fully applicable). *This item was recoded before being used for the scale.*

	Income (z-standardized)	Assessment: household income	Education in years	Household finance change—past	Expected	Political alienation	Focus on performance	SDO	Authoritarianism	Nationalism	Racism	Concern for living conditions		
												Fellow Countrymen	Europeans	People living outside of Europe
Income (z-standardized)	1	.31*	.14*	.23*	-.00	-.06	-.02	.04	-.06	-,02	.02	-.07*	.04	-.05
Assessment: household income		1	.15*	.40*	.10*	-.14*	.02	-.00	-.11*	-.06	-.07*	.01	.06	-.00
Education in years			1	.12*	.07*	-.20*	-.08*	-.18*	-.23*	-.21**	-.15*	-.04	.06	.04
Household finance change—past				1	.23*	-.08*	.12*	.04	-.07*	-.08*	-.09*	.00	.06	.04
—expected					1	-.02	.03	.02	-.02	-.07*	-.09*	.05	.10*	.08*
Political alienation						1	.16*	.25*	26*	.14*	.24*	.05	-.09*	-.10
Focus on performance							1	.19*	.29*	.22*	.21*	.14*	.06	-.07*
SDO								1	.50*	.41*	.33*	.06	-.06	-.16*
Authoritarianism									1	.55*	.48*	.05	-.14*	-.20*
Nationalism										1	.42*	.03	-.11*	-.2*
Racism										.42*	1	.05	-.17*	-.36
Concern for living conditions														
Compatriots												1	.60*	.41*
Europeans													1	.65*
People living outside of Europe														1

*Table 8 Pearson correlations r among the independent variables. * p<0.05*

Collinearity statistics		
	Tolerance	VIF
Income (z-standardized)	.87	1.15
Assessment: household income	.78	1.28
Education in years	.88	1.14
Household finance change—past)	.76	1.31
—expected	.91	1.10
Political alienation	.86	1.17
Focus on performance	.85	1.18
SDO	.68	1.48
Authoritarianism	.52	1.92
Nationalism	.64	1.57
Racism	.62	1.60
Concern for living conditions		
Compatriots	.61	1.65
Europeans	.42	2.36
People living outside of Europe	.48	2.11

Table 9 Collinearity statistics: tolerance and variance influence factor

	Dependent variable: universal solidarity (0–5)											
	Model 1			Model 2			Model 3			Model 4		
	B	Beta	Sig	B	Beta	Sig	B	Beta	Sig	B	Beta	Sig
Constant	.29		.31	1.38		.00	3.11		.00	2.46		.00
Socioeconomic situation												
Income (z-standardized)	-.04	-.03	.40	-.04	-.03	.47	-.01	-.01	.78	-.01	.00	.92
Assessment: household income (1–3)	.04	.02	.64	.04	.02	.59	-.01	-.00	.93	.02	0.01	.84
Education in years	**.06**	**.14**	**.00**	**.04**	**.10**	**.01**	.01	.03	.41	.01	.03	.38
Household finance change												
Past (1–5)	-.02	-.01	.79	-.02	-.01	.74	.03	.02	.55	.02	.02	.67
Expected (1–5)	**.11**	**.07**	**.04**	**.14**	**.09**	**.01**	**.12**	**.07**	**.02**	**.11**	**.07**	**.04**
Political alienation (0–12)				**-.11**	**-.21**	**.00**	-.03	-.07	.05	-.03	-.06	.08
Class/profession												
Appreciation (1–5)				**.10**	**.09**	**.01**	**.08**	**.07**	**.04**	.07	.06	.07
Reward (1–5)				-.08	-.07	.05	-.05	-.04	.25	-.04	-.04	.26
Power (1–5)				-.04	-.03	.41	-.03	-.02	.52	-.03	-.03	.43
Ideologies												
Focus on performance (1–5)							**-.18**	**-.16**	**.00**	**-.18**	**-.15**	**.00**
SDO (0–12)							**-.04**	**-.08**	**.03**	-.03	-.07	.07
Authoritarianism (0–12)							.00	-.01	.86	.00	.00	.99
Nationalism (0–8)							-.04	-.06	.12	-.05	-.06	.10
Racism (0–8)							**-.28**	**-.38**	**.00**	**-.24**	**-.33**	**.00**
Concern for living conditions												
Compatriots (1–5)										-.05	-.04	.37
European (1–5)										-.01	.00	.94
People living outside of Europe (1–5)										**.21**	**.17**	**.00**
R-squared	.03			.09			.31			.33		
Corrected R-squared	.02			.08			.30			.32		
N	951			863			752			748		

Table 10 *Universal solidarity: multiple linear regression. Bold = significant. In brackets = range of answer categories of items.*

	Dependent variable: exclusive solidarity (6)											
	Model 1			Model 2			Model 3			Model 4		
	B	Beta	Sig	B	Beta	Sig	B	Beta	Sig	B	Beta	Sig
Constant	3.36		.00	2.48		.00	.64		0,06	.89		.02
Socioeconomic situation												
Income (z-standardized)	**.14**	**.11**	**.00**	**.15**	**.12**	**.00**	**.13**	**.10**	**0,00**	**.12**	**.10**	**.00**
Assessment: household income (1–3)	-.09	-.05	.15	-.10	-.05	.15	-.05	-.03	0,45	-.06	-.03	.36
Education in years	**-.08**	**-.21**	**.00**	**-.07**	**-.17**	**.00**	**-.03**	**-.07**	**0,02**	**-.02**	**-.06**	**.04**
Household finance change												
Past (1–5)	-.08	-.06	.07	-.06	-.04	.22	-.02	-.01	0,70	-.01	-.01	.76
Expected (1–5)	-.01	-.01	.83	-.02	-.01	.73	.00	.00	0,99	.02	.01	.66
Political alienation (0–12)				**.11**	**.23**	**.00**	**.04**	**.09**	**0,00**	**.05**	**.09**	**.00**
Class/profession												
Appreciation (1–5)				-.04	-.03	.27	-.03	-.03	0,36	-.03	-.03	.39
Reward (1–5)				-.01	-.01	.76	-.04	-.04	0,23	-.04	-.04	.21
Power (1–5)				-.03	-.02	.49	-.04	-.04	0,24	-.03	-.03	.33
Ideologies												
Focus on performance (1–5)							.06	.05	0,09	.05	.05	.13
SDO (0–12)							**.07**	**.15**	**0,00**	**.06**	**.13**	**.00**
Authoritarianism (0–12)							.01	.03	0,53	.02	.03	.37
Nationalism (0–8)							.03	.04	0,31	.02	.03	.36
Racism (0–8)							**.27**	**.38**	**0,00**	**.22**	**.32**	**.00**
Concern for living conditions												
Compatriots (1–5)										**.14**	**.11**	**.00**
European (1–5)										.02	.02	.72
People living outside of Europe (1–5)										**-.24**	**-.20**	**.00**
R-squared	.06			.12			.33			.36		
Corrected R-squared	.05			.11			.32			.35		
N	918			829			727			723		

Table 11 *Exclusive solidarity: multiple linear regression. Bold = significant. In brackets = range of answer categories of items.*

Descriptive statistics for the survey population and official statistics				
	SOCRIS survey		AMIS*	
Gender	N	%	N	%
Female	483	48.1%	2,064,102	45.93%
Male	521	51.9%	2,430,114	54.07%
Age				
18–29	233	23.2%	988,327	22.17%
30–39	214	21.3%	1,039,887	23.33%
40–49	230	22.9%	1,153,925	25.89%
50–64	327	32.6%	1,275,058	28.61%
Citizenship				
Austrian	959	95.5	3,569,667	79.43%
Non-Austrian	45	4.5	924,549	20.57%
Region				
Burgenland	31	3.09%	132,440	2.95%
Carinthia	73	7.27%	267,924	5.97%
Lower Austria	194	19.32%	768,709	17.12%
Upper Austria	166	16.53%	769,258	17.13%
Salzburg	59	5.88%	300,399	6.69%
Styria	142	14.14%	627,985	13.98%
Tyrol	73	7.27%	391,000	8.71%
Vorarlberg	45	4.48%	190,816	4.25%
Vienna	221	22.01%	1,042,799	23.22%
			Statistics Austria**	
Highest level of education				
Mandatory school	190	18.92%	629.1	13.81%
Apprenticeship diploma	238	23.71%	1644.9	36.11%
Medium-level technical and vocational school	322	32.07%	570.7	12.53%
Higher-level school	254	25.30%	854.8	18.77%
University and similar	190	18.92%	855.7	18.79%
Employment status				
Employed	734	73.11%	4,045,928	83.44%
Self-employed	204	20.32%	500,054	10.31%
Unemployed	66	6.57%	302,843	6.25%
Working time				
Part-time	495	73.01%	3,099,300	71.95%
Full-time	183	26.99%	1,208,000	28.05%

SOCRIS survey conducted from July to September 2017

* AMIS (Arbeitsmarktinformationssystem—Labor Market Information System), data for September 2017, https://www.dnet.at/amis/Datenbank/DB_AI.aspx

** Labor Force Survey Quarterly Data—3rd Quarter 2017, Statistics Austria

Table 12 *Descriptive statistics for the survey population and official statistics.*

Reliability test for binary variables

Item statistics

	Kuder-Richardson when item is deleted				
Item: 1 =	Universal solidarity	1 =	Exclusive solidarity—used	1 =	Exclusive solidarity—not used
More support for the long-term unemployed	.48	Less support for the long-term unemployed	.56	More support for the long-term unemployed	.56
More support for refugees	.36	Less support for refugees	.47	Less support for refugees	.19
Against a contribution-based welfare state support	.45	In favor of contribution-based welfare state support	.52	In favor of contribution-based welfare state support	19
Against labor market favoritism	.46	In favor of labor market favoritism	.56	In favor of labor market favoritism	.23
In favor of global redistribution	.53	Against global redistribution	.62	Against global redistribution	.34
Kuder-Richardson overall	.51		.60		.38

Number of cases: 1004

Table 13 *Reliability test for binary variables*

KMO and Bartlett's test		Universal solidarity	Exclusive solidarity
Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin measure of sampling adequacy		.675	.714
Bartlett's test of sphericity	Approx. chi-square	467.731	572.759
	Df	10	10
	Sig.	.000	.000
	N	938	938

	Total variance explained					
	Universal solidarity			Exclusive solidarity		
	Initial Eigenvalues					
Component	Total	% of variance	Cumulative %	Total	% of variance	Cumulative %
1	1.937	38.746	38.746	2.073	41.467	41.467
2	.946	18.928	57.675	.918	18.369	59.836
3	.910	18.201	75.875	.849	16.986	76.822
4	.624	12.476	88.352	.607	12.147	88.969
5	.582	11.648	100.000	.552	11.031	100.000

Reproduced correlations: residuals and communalities

		Support for the long-term unemployed	Support for refugees	Contribution-based welfare state support	Labor market favoritism	Global redistribution	
Residuals	Support for the long-term unemployed	.133	.048	-.003	-.065	-.008	Exclusive solidarity
	Support for refugees	.095	.419	-.045	.002	-.024	
	Contribution-based welfare state support	.056	.050	.305	.062	-.001	
	Labor market favoritism	.057	.022	.086	.297	.040	
	Global redistribution	.003	.019	-.020	.044	.083	
						.083	
						Universal solidarity	

Diagonal: Reproduced/extracted communalities

Table 14 *Factor analysis: KMO and Bartlett's test, total variance explained, reproduced correlations (residuals and communalities)*



Figure 1 *Scree plots*